We investigate whether the relation between auditor tenure and audit quality is conditional on auditor specialization and fee dependence. Although prior studies have investigated the relation between extended auditor-client tenure and audit quality, none has examined how this relation is jointly influenced by both auditor specialization and fee dependence. Our main analyses, using accrual quality as a measure of audit quality, show that firms audited by specialists (vs. non-specialists) have relatively higher audit quality with extended auditor tenure, and that this relation is negatively moderated by auditors' fee dependence on clients.
Does auditor tenure improve audit quality? Moderating Effects of Industry
Specialization and Fee Dependence
Introduction
In this study, we investigate whether the relation between auditor tenure and audit quality is conditional on auditor specialization and fee dependence (in terms of economic contribution to the public accounting firm's income). We argue that auditor tenure is associated with two related constructs: auditor expertise and economic incentives. First, auditor tenure is associated with greater acquired expertise in that with extended auditor tenure, the auditor can gain a better understanding of the client's business processes, and risks (Bell et al. 1997) . Longer auditor tenure may be associated with reduced vigilance through over-familiarity with the client (Mautz and Sharaf 1961) , an effect that may be remedied by greater auditor expertise (Smith and Kida 1990; Libby and Luft 1993; Solomon, Shields, and Whittington 1999) . Second, extended auditor tenure (without the prospect of mandatory rotation) may create economic incentives for auditors to be less independent in that auditors may acquiesce to the client's demands in order to continue to secure a stream of future audit fees (Hoyle 1978; Conference Board 2005) . Also, a corollary of the earlier expertise argument is that to the extent that the auditor develops, through extended tenure, expertise and a reputation for performing audits in the client's industry, the auditor also develops incentives to improve audit quality in order to protect this reputational capital and loss of future revenue streams (DeAngelo 1981; Krishnan 2003) . The effects operate in opposite directions. These offsetting effects suggest that in assessing the effects of auditor tenure on audit quality, it is important to consider the joint consideration of the effects of auditor expertise and incentives, and not either the effects of expertise or incentives alone.
Prior research generally shows that auditor tenure is associated with higher audit quality (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds 2002; Myers, Myers, and Omer 2003; Mansi, Maxswell, and Miller 2004; Ghosh and Moon 2005; Chen, Lin, and Lin 2008) . However, recent research shows some conflicting results. For instance, there is evidence that extended tenure is associated with both positive and negative effects on audit quality (Davis, Soo, and Trompeter 2008) . Also, Carey and Simnett (2006) find no relation between audit partner tenure and accruals. Instead, they
find that audit quality (as proxied by the incidence of going concern opinions and the proclivity to beat earnings benchmarks) is associated with lower audit quality when audit partner tenure increases.
Studies on the moderating effect of incentives effects on auditor tenure have found conflicting results on whether audit/non-audit fees (common proxies for auditor incentives to please the client) are associated with poorer or superior audit quality with auditor tenure (c.f. Krishnan 2007, Stanley and Dezoort 2007) . Similarly, studies that assess the empirical relation between auditor tenure and auditor specialization (a common proxy for auditor expertise) have found conflicting results, and either document no moderating effect of auditor specialization (Myers et al. 2003) , or an interaction (Stanley and Dezoort 2007, Gul, Fung, and Jaggi 2009) . None of these studies examines the effect of both expertise and incentives on the auditor tenure-audit quality relation. 1 1 Gunny, Krishnan, and Zhang (2007) also examine the effect of auditor tenure, auditor specialization and fees on audit quality. However, they only examine two-way interactions among these variables, not a three-way interaction. For instance, they find some evidence that tenure and specialization are jointly associated with higher audit quality, while tenure and abnormal total fees are jointly associated with lower audit quality. Note that their sample only includes firms audited by non-Big 4 firms, and hence, their results may be not generalizable since a large proportion of the firms in the U.S. are audited by Big 4 auditors.
These opposite and conflicting predictions and findings in prior literature may be attributable to failure to jointly examine expertise and incentive constructs, differences in empirical proxies, differences in sample or sample periods used, or a combination of these reasons. In this study, we develop predictions about the effect of auditor tenure on audit quality based on a more complete consideration of the moderating effects of auditor expertise and incentives, and test our predictions across a common set of empirical proxies used in prior studies and over a common sample period.
The issue of whether longer auditor tenure impairs auditor independence and audit quality has a controversial history (e.g., see Mautz and Sharaf 1961; Metcalf Committee Report, U.S. Senate 1976). Recent financial scandals have also precipitated concerns over whether auditor tenure impairs auditor independence and audit quality, and have led to regulatory interest in the use of mandatory rotation to enhance auditor independence and reduce the likelihood of audit failures (POB 2002; SOX 2002; IOSCO 2005) .
Mandatory rotation of auditor has taken two forms: at the audit firm level and at the audit partner level. In this study, we examine auditor rotation at the firm level, which has continued to attract debate over its efficacy. Mandatory rotation of audit firms has been implemented in various parts of the world such as Brazil, Italy, and Singapore, while mandatory rotation of audit partners was implemented in Canada and the U.S. In the U.S., mandatory audit firm rotation was part of reforms considered by the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO). While the GAO concluded that it would be more prudent to take time to assess the effectiveness of the Sarbanes Oxley Act reforms before mandating audit firm rotation, it was left as an option for the future (GAO 2003 Arguments on the costs and benefits of extended auditor tenure invariably involve issues related to auditor expertise and incentives. Arguments in favor of extended auditor-client relation rest primarily on an expertise argument (although, as we explain below, an incentive argument can also apply). Specifically, auditors climb a steep learning curve to understand the client's industry and the business it operates, along with the associated risks (Knapp 1991; Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2002) . This suggests that auditors are less likely to detect errors when they first engage in the audit of the client.
There is empirical evidence that alleged audit failures (AICPA 1992; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Carcello and Nagy 2004a) and the likelihood of litigation (Palmrose 1991 ) are higher during the early years of an auditor-client relation. With longer tenure, auditors develop a better understanding, both of the client and the industry. One implication is that, with extended tenure, to the extent that the auditor develops a reputation for performing audits in the client's industry and grows his client base in that industry, the auditor also develops incentives to improve audit quality in order to protect this reputation and loss of clients from inappropriately acquiescing to any single client's demands (DeAngelo 1981; Krishnan 2003) .
Arguments against extended auditor-client relationships and in favor of mandatory rotation are based on both cognitive (expertise-related) and incentive arguments. For example, one reason cited by the Cohen Commission (AICPA 1978) for mandatory rotation is that the new auditor brings a fresh perspective to the audit. Allegedly, an auditor who has audited the client over time can become over-familiar with the client, become complacent, and develop "blind spots." These are cognitive limitations independent of an incentive argument, and may be mitigated by auditors with expertise (Smith and Kida 1990) .
The second reason is an incentive argument. For instance, it has been alleged that "long association between a corporation and an accounting firm may lead to such close identification of the accounting firm with the interests of its client's management …" (U.S. Senate 1976, p. 21) . Similarly, the report of the Commission on Auditors'
Responsibilities (AICPA 1978, p. 108) highlights that, with mandatory rotation, "the auditor's incentive for resisting pressure from management would be increased."
Specifically, over time, the auditor may become less independent, less skeptical, and more complacent, motivated by concerns about maintaining the client relation so as to profit from it. This argument suggests that an auditor's incentives to be less independent increase with extended tenure, particularly for important clients that the auditor earns significant audit fees from.
In summary, increased auditor tenure is associated with both increased expertise factors and associated incentives to protect reputational capital (which increases audit quality), as well as increased incentives to please the client (which reduces audit quality).
In our study, we proxy auditor expertise by whether auditors are industry specialists. We use this proxy because a client's business operations and risks vary by industry, and prior research documents industry-specific variation in the nature and incidence of financial statement errors (Maletta and Wright 1996) . Hence, industry specialist auditors' greater expertise in the specific industry domain enables them to better acquire knowledge concerning the client's business and risks (Bell, Peecher, and Solomon 2005) .
Specialization also proxies for incentives for auditors to protect their reputational capital and avoid costly litigation (Krishnan 2003) . Hence, specialization can be considered to be proxying jointly both for expertise and the incentive to protect this expertise. We consider the dependence of an auditor on fees received from a particular client to be associated with greater auditors' incentives to side the client and be less objective in their judgments. We assess how auditor specialization and fee dependence interact with auditor tenure in determining audit quality.
Empirical measures for audit quality can be noisy and there is little consensus on what is the most appropriate proxy. Hence, we conduct our empirical tests using multiple proxies of audit quality that have been used in prior studies. We use, as our main proxy for audit quality, the accrual quality measure developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) , with modifications suggested by McNichols (2002) . We proxy auditor industry specialization based on the industry market share of the Big N auditors. We use the measure of client importance by Chung and Kallapur (2003) at the city level to proxy auditors' economic bond with the client.
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Our results indicate that audit quality is higher for firms audited by specialists relative to non-specialists when auditor tenure increases. Further, we find that such a relation is moderated by fee dependence. These results are generally robust to various sensitivity analyses, and other proxies for audit quality such as higher propensity for auditors to issue going-concern opinion to financially distressed firms and stronger market's response to quarterly earnings surprises (i.e., earnings-returns coefficients).
Our paper contributes to the literature on the audit quality effects of audit tenure.
From a theoretical perspective, our paper contributes to the audit tenure literature by 3 The individual practice office in a particular city is generally the locus of contracting between the client and the audit firm. Therefore, the variable of interest is the importance of the client to the practice office at the city level rather than across the entire audit firm.
posting and demonstrating that the tenure-audit quality effect is conditional on both auditor specialization and fee dependence. Prior studies have examined only a subset of these independent variables, and theoretical arguments made in these studies on conditions under which auditor tenure improves or impairs audit quality are less complete. Our results also provide useful evidence to regulators and policy makers on the impact of audit tenure on audit quality. Regulators in various countries have mandated auditor rotation, presumably on the premise that extended auditor tenure is detrimental to audit quality. We show that extended auditor tenure does not necessarily decrease audit quality; in fact, audit quality is improved with extended tenure when two conditions are met-the auditor is a specialist and has low fee dependence. These results should be helpful to the GAO in its assessment of whether to mandate audit firm rotation (GAO 2003) , and also to other standard setters that are deliberating on this issue (IOSCO 2005) . The findings should also be of interest to public accounting firms in their efforts to improve audit quality. Our results suggest that in developing longer-term ties with a client, public accounting firms should consider investing in resources to further develop expertise in the client's industry and to avoid overly high fee dependence on any client.
In turn, this has broader implications on public accounting firms' strategies/policies to position themselves as industry specialists and on their client acceptance/retention decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss prior literature and develop our hypotheses in section 2. Section 3 describes our sample and variable measurement. We present the empirical results in Sections 4, while Section 5 discusses the sensitivity analyses performed. We offer some concluding remarks in Section 6.
Background and hypothesis development

Effects of auditor tenure
Arising from regulatory interest in the issue of mandatory auditor rotation, several recent studies investigate the relation between auditor tenure and various measures of audit quality. The dominant finding is that audit quality improves with auditor tenure (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003; Mansi et al. 2004; Ghosh and Moon 2005) . There are some exceptions, with recent evidence showing that audit quality deteriorates either with increased auditor tenure (Carey and Simnett 2006) , or both at the earlier or later part of auditor tenure (Davis et al. 2008) . A recent study by Manry, Mock, and Turner (2008) find that audit quality is improved only for small clients with partner tenure of greater than seven years.
Some recent studies examine the interaction between auditor tenure and either fees or auditor specialization. However, seemingly opposite conclusions are reached. One set of studies examines the interaction between auditor tenure and audit fees. Gul et al. (2007) find that non-audit fees (but not audit fees) are associated with poorer audit quality in terms of higher discretionary current accruals for firms with short auditor tenure. In contrast, Stanley and DeZoort (2007) document that audit fees (but not nonaudit fees) are associated with improved audit quality in terms of lower likelihood of restatement for firms with short auditor tenure. Another set of studies examines the interaction between auditor tenure and auditor specialization, but results differ depending on the proxy for audit quality. Myers et al. (2003) find no such interaction with discretionary accruals. In contrast, using discretionary accruals and restatements as proxies for audit quality, other studies document this interaction (Stanley and Dezoort 2007; Gul et al. 2009 ).
Effects of industry specialization
Audit firms that are industry specialists invest time and financial resources in developing personnel and technology in specific industries to improve audit quality.
Thus, auditors working in audit firms that are industry specialists have more opportunities to develop expertise than those working in non-specialist firms. Because clients' operations and business risks vary by industry and research indicates that the nature and incidence of financial statement errors vary by industry (Maletta and Wright 1996) , industry-specialist auditors' greater expertise in the specific industry allows them to better acquire knowledge concerning the client's business, operations, and risks (Bell et al. 2005 ) compared to non-specialists. Consequently, they are also less likely to be misled by management representations (Solomon et al. 1999) .
Auditors who are industry specialists also likely have incentives to protect their reputational capital and avoid reputation damage. Inasmuch as auditors have been posited to be more independent when they have a larger client base to lose (DeAngelo 1981), 4 industry specialists have more to lose from poor audit quality in terms of losing future revenue streams and fee premium. Thus, they have greater incentives than nonspecialists to maintain high quality audits (be more independent) to avoid jeopardizing this reputation (Watts and Zimmerman 1983) through litigation exposure (Shu 2000) .
Prior research shows that specialist auditors' clients are less likely to be associated with SEC enforcement actions (Carcello and Nagy 2004b) and are more likely to comply with auditing standards (O' Keefe, Kin, and Gaver 1994).
Effects of fee dependence
Economic theory indicates that when an auditor derives a high proportion of revenue from a particular client, this creates economic bonds on the auditor and causes the auditor to be financially reliant on the client, which can cause the auditor to lose objectivity (DeAngelo 1981) . Psychology research suggests the same outcome but the mechanism by which the auditor loses objectivity with fee dependence is said to be unconscious (Kunda 1990; Bazerman, Morgan, and Lowenstein 1997) .
We posit that greater clarity on the auditor tenure-performance relationship requires the joint consideration of the auditor's industry specialization and fee dependence. Two interaction patterns are possible, and we discuss each of these in the next two subsections.
Auditor tenure and industry specialization relation, and the moderating effect of fee dependence
The first interaction pattern focuses on the relation between auditor tenure and industry specialization, and how their effect on audit quality is contingent on fee dependence.
In terms of the relation between auditor tenure and industry specialization, one of the arguments for extended auditor tenure (and against mandatory rotation) is that auditors take time to acquire specific knowledge about the industry and business of their clients.
Auditors who are industry specialists begin the audit of a new client with superior knowledge of the industry, which facilitates their understanding of the client relative to non-specialists. One possibility is that, particularly in a relatively static industry and client environment, non-specialists can catch up with the specialists in their knowledge of the client with increased tenure, which suggests no effect of industry specialization with an extended auditor-client relationship.
However, the environment is more likely to be dynamic (Bell et al. 2005) . In a dynamic and changing environment, specialists are more likely to be able to adapt, update their knowledge, and keep abreast of changes. Indeed, psychology research indicates that people who start off with higher domain knowledge are better able to acquire more high-quality knowledge over time and at a faster rate than those with lower domain knowledge (e.g., see Chiesi, Spilich, and Voss 1979; Bonner 2007) . 5 This notion of adaptation over time is implicit in a common argument made against extended tenure-that is, as auditor tenure increases, auditors develop more blind spots in terms of detecting problems in the client's business process and controls, and errors in the financial statements. Presumably, this can arise because the auditor becomes overfamiliar with the client and complacent (e.g., in assuming that things that had worked in the past will continue to do so), or because the auditor has not sufficiently kept abreast with changes in the client and in the industry. However, the greater resources invested by audit firms specializing in particular industries in their personnel and technology likely enable their staff to be more adaptive in their audit approaches in response to business or industry changes. To the extent that the environment is dynamic over time, these arguments suggest that audit quality is more likely to increase with tenure (i.e., over time)
for specialist auditors than non-specialist auditors. In addition, as we mentioned earlier, specialist auditors have greater incentives than non-specialists to maintain high quality audits to protect their reputational capital.
However, a competing incentive to reduce audit quality arising from fee dependence is likely to reduce the beneficial effect of auditor specialization on extended auditor tenure. We predict that the specialization by tenure interaction described above is contingent on fee dependence. With extended auditor tenure, audit quality correspondingly increases with industry specialization but is more likely so when fee dependence is low. The reason is that although specialist auditors are likely associated with higher audit quality with longer auditor tenure, incentives to align with the interest 5 Like the other theories we use (e.g., auditor expertise, bias from fee dependence), this theory of learning is at the individual level as it is the audit partner who interacts with the client and forms audit judgments. These effects likely generalize at the firm level to the extent that the public accounting firm is essentially a collection of individual auditors. Note that the non-availability of empirical proxies for tenure, fee dependence and specialization at the individual partner necessitates that we use firm-level proxies for these constructs.
of an important client (in terms of fees earned) may somewhat cloud their professional judgment and increase their proclivity to take the side of the client on controversial accounting issues. This premise is consistent with the argument by Bazerman et al. (1997, p. 93-94 ) that with fee dependence, "independence becomes a problem even for the most moral, honest auditor. Despite the auditors' best effort to place the external users'
interests above the client's and to maintain objectivity, they may be unable to completely overcome cognitive or psychological biases that make them arrive at marginal decisions in the client's favor." This suggests the following directional hypothesis:
H1a: As auditor tenure increases, audit quality increases with auditors' industry specialization but is more likely so when fee dependence is low.
Auditor tenure and fee dependence relation, and the moderating effect of industry specialization
The second possible interaction pattern focuses on the relation between auditor tenure and fee dependence, and how their effect on audit quality is contingent on the auditor's industry specialization.
In terms of the relation between auditor tenure and fee dependence, one argument against extended auditor tenure (and for auditor rotation) is that over time, the auditor becomes less independent and audit quality goes down arising from economic bonds by way of fee dependence formed between auditor and client. The reasoning is that with mandatory rotation (i.e., without extended tenure), "in disagreeing with management, auditors would no longer be risking a stream of revenues that they believed would continue in 'perpetuity,' since the audit engagement would no longer be perceived as permanent" (Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise 2005, p. 39). This argument suggests lower audit quality with longer auditor tenure, with the effect magnified in the presence of high fee dependence since an auditor would be loath to lose a client that contributes significantly to the income earned by the public accounting firm. 6 Interestingly, economic bonding from high fee dependence also argues against short auditor tenure. Following DeAngelo (1981) , to the extent that auditors low-ball audit fees, auditors are more likely to acquiesce to clients' demands in the initial years for fear of threats of dismissal and loss of future quasi-rents" (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002 )-this effect should be greater for higher fee dependence as the magnitude of these quasi-rents is clearly higher for clients whose fees form a significant proportion of the public accounting firm's revenue. Thus, the joint consideration of fee dependence and auditor tenure does not indicate a clear directional effect on audit quality: with greater economic incentives to side the client with higher fee dependence, audit quality may suffer either with extended tenure or short tenure. However, any dysfunctional effect is less likely for industry specialists than non-specialists. The reason is that specialist auditors are more likely to resist such incentives arising from their relatively stronger incentives to preserve their reputational asset. Because the directional nature of the fee dependence by tenure relation is unclear, we make a general prediction below:
H1b: The joint effect of auditor tenure and fee dependence on audit quality is moderated by auditors' industry specialization.
Data and variables' measurement
Data
Our initial sample consists of 40,881 firm-years with fee information from the Audit Analytics database, and financial information in Compustat for fiscal years 2000-2005. 7 We restrict our study to clients of Big N auditors to control for brand name Chung and Kallapur 2003) . Accordingly, we remove 11,436 firm-years that are not audited by Big N auditors. Given the fundamentally different operating characteristics associated with financial institutions, we exclude 3,764 financial companies from the analyses (SIC Codes 6000-6999). We drop 4,356 firm-year observations due to missing data needed to compute fee dependence at the city-level. We remove 3,352 firm-years without sufficient data to compute accrual quality. Finally, we delete the top and bottom one percent of each of the continuous control variables used in the regression to remove extreme values, and the final sample usable for the study is 12,783 firm-years, with complete information on the control variables. Panels A and B
in Table 1 report the distribution of sample firms by year and industry, respectively, for the data used for the accrual quality test.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Auditor tenure
Following prior studies (Myers et al. 2003; Ghosh and Moon 2005) , we measure tenure as the cumulative number of years the auditor has been employed by the firm. We do not employ a continuous measure for auditor tenure since the relation between auditor tenure and audit quality may not be linear. Instead, we use dummy variables to capture the effect of tenure on audit quality in two ways. First, we use the median tenure as a cut off to indicate long versus short tenure (DTENU). Second, following prior studies (e.g., Johnson et al. 2002; Carcello and Nagy 2004a) , we use two indicator variables, one for short tenure (SHORT, equals one when the length of the auditor-client relationship is three years or less, and zero otherwise), and another for long tenure (LONG, equals one when the length of the auditor-client relationship is nine years or longer, and zero otherwise). The comparison group relates to firms with medium auditor tenure (four to eight years).
Auditor industry specialization
Previous studies (e.g., Chung and Kallpaur 2003; Lim and Tan 2008) typically use the market share of the Big N public accounting firms to proxy for auditor specialization.
We define auditors with a large industry market share (defined as two-digit SIC code) as the specialist (SPEC). We consider an auditor to have a large market share in the industry if the auditor has at least 24% for the 2000-2001 period, and 30% for the 2002-2005 period. 8 We also test the sensitivity of our results using other operationalizations of auditor industry specialization.
Fee dependence
We use client importance, which captures the relative significance of a client's total fees to the fee revenue received by the auditor in the same city, 9 as a measure to capture economic bonding between the auditor and the clients (Chung and Kallapur 2003) .
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This measure better captures the specific economic bonding unique to each auditor, relative to the auditor's total fee revenue. A total fees measure does not take into consideration the size of the auditor, in that the same total fees may be economically significant for one auditor but not for another, depending on its total fee revenue. can also create similar incentives for auditors to compromise audit quality in their reporting decisions with respect to a specific client. Second, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) passed in 2002 effectively bans auditors from performing many types of non-audit services, leading to a corresponding decline in nonaudit services revenue. However, total fees is likely to be stable as the decline in revenues from non-audit services are likely to be offset by substantial increases in audit fees due to, for example, the cost of complying Section 404 implementation costs under SOX.
Empirical model
The conventional linear discretionary accruals models introduced by Jones (1991) have been widely used in accounting literature to estimate discretionary accruals (e.g., Myers et al. 2003; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 2002) . 
where CA = current accruals measured by net income before extraordinary items plus deprecation and amortization minis operating cash flow; OCF = operating cash flow at year t-1, t , and t+1; ΔREV = change in revenues; PPE = gross value of property, plant, and equipment.
All variables are scaled by average total assets. The regression is run for each industryyear with a minimum of 20 observations in each 2-digit SIC industry. The coefficients α 1 to α 3 measure the associations of current accruals with the cash flows in the previous, current, and subsequent years, respectively. We expect α 1 and α 3 to be positive, and α 2 to be negative. 11 The residual from the regression is denoted as DD. The absolute value of the DD is our measure of accrual quality (denoted as |DD|). 12 Higher values of |DD| indicate lower accrual quality.
We run the following regression to test the association between auditor tenure, auditor specialization, and fee dependence on accrual quality:
|DD| = accrual quality measure which is the absolute value of the residual estimated from equation (1); TENU = auditor tenure measured as follows; DTENU = indicator variable equals one if the tenure is greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise; SHORT = indicator variable, equals one when the length of the auditorclient relationship is three years or less, and zero otherwise; LONG = indicator variable, equals one when the length of the auditorclient relationship is nine years or longer, and zero otherwise; MV = natural log of market capitalization at fiscal year end; INGR = industry sales growth over the year (by two-digit SIC code); OCF = operating cash flows divided by total assets at fiscal year end; LITIG = 1 if the firm operates in a high-litigation industry and 0 otherwise. High-litigation industries are industries with SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7374 (as used by Frankel et al. 2002 and Ashbaugh et al. 2003) ; ZSCORE = Zmijewski's (1984) bankruptcy scores; MB = market to book value of equity; AGE = natural logarithm of the number of years since the company was listed on a stock exchange; SPEC = 1 if the auditor is the specialist in the industry, and 0 otherwise; 11 Accruals represent inter-temporal shifting of cash flows. Other things being constant, if more of current cash flows are shifted to either the previous or the next period, the current accruals will be higher, and the current cash flows will be lower. Hence α 2 is expected to be negative. Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that the current accruals anticipate future cash flows; hence α 3 is expected to be positive. Dechow and Dichev (2002) also argue that some accruals defer the recognition of some past cash flows into current earnings and that once current cash flow is controlled for, the association between current accruals and past cash flows should be positive. Hence α 1 is expected to be positive. 12 Dechow and Dichev (2002) uses the standard deviation of the residuals for each firm as the accrual quality measure. They suggest that an alternative measure for the accrual quality at the firm-year level is the absolute value of the residual for that year (note 6). Both Srinidhi and Gul (2007) and Jones et al. (2008) use the absolute values as their proxy for earnings management.
FEE
= fee dependence measured by the ratio of a particular client's total fees given all total fees received by the audit firm in the same city.
We include various control variables that may potentially affect accruals. Small firms, those in industries with high sales growth, and firms with low cash flow from operations tend to record higher accruals (Myers et al. 2003) , while firms with high litigation risk are more likely to manage earnings (Frankel et al. 2002) . We control for firms' financial conditions (as proxied by Zmijewski's bankruptcy scores) and growth opportunities since financially distressed firms and high growth firms are more likely to manage earnings (Defond and Jiambalvo 1994) .
The interaction term, TENU*SPEC, is used when we test H1a. The coefficient for TENU*SPEC shows the incremental effect of TENU on |DD| when a firm is audited by specialist auditors than when it is audited by non-specialist auditors. To the extent that the improvement in audit quality with extended auditor tenure is higher for specialists compared to non-specialists, we expect the coefficient for TENU*SPEC to be negative.
However, H1a predicts that the negative association between TENU*SPEC and |DD| to be moderated (reduced) by fee dependence; hence, we expect the coefficient for TENU*SPEC*FEE to be positive. The interaction term, TENU*FEE, is used to test H1b.
The coefficient for TENU*FEE shows the incremental effect of TENU on |DD| when a firm's fee revenue is more important to an auditor. The extent that TENU*FEE is moderated by auditor specialization is captured by TENU*SPEC*FEE.
Because the accrual quality for a particular firm may not be fully independent over consecutive years, residuals obtained in regression analyses may be serially correlated.
Hence, we use OLS regressions with clustered robust errors (Rogers 1993; Petersen 2009 ). 
Results
In Table 2 , we report the mean coefficients of the industry-year cross-sectional regressions from estimating equation (1). Adj. R 2 is the average of the adjusted R 2 from the 286 industry-year regressions. The t-statistics are based on the mean of the coefficients from the industry-year regressions.
As expected, a1 and a3, the coefficients of previous and subsequent period cash flows, are positive and significant at the 1% level. a2, the coefficient of the current cash flow, is negative and significant at the 1% level. Consistent with our expectation, we find that increases in sales are associated significantly with higher current accruals. However, we do no find a significant association between PPE and current accruals. The average adjusted R 2 is 39.3%, similar to that reported in Dechow and Dichev (2002) .
[Insert Table 2 here]
In Table 3 , we report the descriptive statistics in Panel A and the correlation coefficients for the variables used in equation (2) The correlations between |DD| and DTENU, and between |DD| and LONG, are both -0.05 (significant at 1% level), consistent with the notion that long auditor tenure is associated with higher audit quality. The correlation between |DD| and SHORT is 0.04 (also significant at 1% level), suggesting that short auditor tenure is detrimental to audit quality. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Krishnan 2003) , |DD| is negatively and significantly associated with SPEC (correlation=-0.09). We do not find evidence that fee dependence alone erodes audit quality. The association between |DD| and FEE is -0.03 and significant. 14 [Insert Table 3 here]
We report the regression results for the accrual quality test in 
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In contrast, high growth firms, firms with higher bankruptcy risk, and firms in highly litigious industries are associated with lower audit quality (higher |DD|).
We include an additional interaction term DTENU*SPEC in model 2. The coefficient for DTENU*SPEC is negative and statistically significant at 5% level, suggesting that the audit quality is higher for specialists relative to non-specialists when auditor tenure is long.
14 Frankel et al. (2002) report a similar negative correlation between ABSDACC and rank of total fees (-0.03, significant at 10%), while Khurana and Raman (2006) also report a significant negative relation (-0.06) between TFEE/OFFICEREV and their proxy of audit quality, cost of equity. 15 The negative association between |DD| and INGR is unexpected. Myers et al. (2003) also report mixed results for the association between discretionary accruals and INGR. They find that INGR is negatively associated with discretionary accruals in the absolute accruals test, although the association is not significant. For the signed accruals tests, they find that INGR is negatively (positively) and significantly associated with positive (negative) discretionary accruals at 1% level.
In model 3, we include the interaction term DTENU*FEE. The coefficient for DTENU*FEE, which shows the incremental effect of DTENU on |DD| when fee dependence increases, is statistically insignificant.
The full model with various interaction terms is provided in model 4. The coefficient for DTENU*SPEC is negative and significant at 5% level, and the coefficient for DTENU*SPEC*FEE is positive and significant at 1% level. This finding is consistent with H1a, where we predict that the negative association between DTENU*SPEC and |DD| is moderated by fee dependence. In contrast, the results are inconsistent with H1b since the coefficient for DTENU*FEE is insignificant in both models 3 and 4.
Panel B reports the results when auditor tenure is proxied by two indicator variables,
SHORT and LONG. In model 1, SHORT is positively and significantly associated with |DD|, while LONG is not associated with |DD|, consistent with the evidence reported in Johnson et al. (2002) . In model 2, the coefficient for the interaction terms LONG*SPEC is negative and significant, suggesting that audit quality is higher for specialists relative to non-specialists when auditor tenure is long. In contrast, the coefficient for the interaction SHORT*SPEC is insignificant, indicating that audit quality is not higher for specialists relative to non-specialists when auditor tenure is short. In model 3, the coefficients for SHORT*FEE and LONG*FEE are negative but statistically insignificant.
In the last model where we include all the interaction terms, the coefficient for LONG*SPEC is negative and statistically significant at 5% level. Further, the coefficient for LONG*SPEC*FEE is positive and significant at 5% level. On the other hand, the coefficients for SHORT*SPEC and SHORT*SPEC*FEE are both statistically insignificant. The evidence suggests that the negative association between tenure and specialization interaction is moderated by fee dependence only for long tenured auditors but not for short-tenured auditors. Again, this finding is consistent with our prediction in H1a. As before, we do not find evidence to support H1b, since the coefficients for SHORT*FEE and LONG*FEE are insignificant in both models 3 and 4.
Overall, our results suggest that audit quality is higher with increased auditor tenure for specialists but not non-specialists. Further, consistent with our prediction in H1a, the interaction between auditor tenure and specialization is moderated by fee dependence.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Sensitivity analyses
Alternative measure of specialization
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Krishnan 2003) , we use the national industry market share of the Big N public accounting firms to proxy for auditor specialization.
More recent studies (e.g., however, suggest that the appropriate unit to measure auditor expertise is at the city level. We test the robustness of our results by using this alternative definition of specialization at the city level. We define auditors having the largest market share in an industry in a particular city to be industry leaders at the city level (CSPEC). We also specify another indicator variable, BSPEC, which equals one if the auditor is a specialist both at the national and city level. We report the results for the full regression model in Table 5 .
Consistent with our main analysis, the coefficients for DTENU*CSPEC and DTENU*BSPEC are negative and significant and the coefficients for DTENU*CSPEC*FEE and DTENU*BSPEC*FEE are positive and significant. We also find consistent results when tenure is measured by LONG and SHORT. The negative association between tenure and specialization interaction is moderated by fee dependence only for long tenured auditors but not for short tenured auditors. This finding is consistent with our prediction in H1a. As before, we do not find evidence to support H1b.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Signed accrual quality tests
In our main analyses, we use the absolute value of accrual quality as a measure of audit quality, which captures the combined effect of income-increasing and incomedecreasing accruals. However, income-increasing accruals may pose a greater concern to auditors, as they are likely to be associated with opportunistic earnings management. On the other hand, while downward adjustment of reported earnings could be opportunistic, it is more ambivalent as a measure of earnings management as it may also be considered as a form of conservative accounting (Ashbaugh et al. 2003) . We conduct separate tests based on the signs of the accrual quality.
As the results for the full regression model reported in Table 6 show, for the positive accrual sample, we find consistent results with our main analysis. However, the evidence for negative accrual is mixed. The coefficient for DTENU*SPEC*FEE is positive and significant while the coefficient for LONG*SPEC*FEE is insignificant.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Alternative model specification for accruals
We use the modified accrual quality measure by McNichols (2002) to proxy for audit quality. As a robustness check, we also use the cross-sectional modified Jones's (1991) model to estimate discretionary accruals. Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) show that discretionary accrual estimates are correlated with firm performance. To adjust for performance, we compute discretionary current accruals based on a portfolio approach, as in Ashbaugh et al. (2003) . Specifically, we partition firms within each two-digit SIC code into deciles based on their prior year's ROA. Performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals are calculated as the difference between a sample firm's discretionary current accruals and the median discretionary current accruals for each ROA decile excluding the sample firm. The absolute values of the discretionary current accruals serve as our alternative proxy for audit quality. 16 We obtain similar results (untabulated)
as our main analysis using this alternative proxy for audit quality. The coefficient estimate for DTENU*SPEC is negative and marginally significant (t=-1.62, p=0.10), and DTENU*SPEC*FEE is positive and significant (t=2.28. p=0.02). The coefficient estimate for LONG*SPEC is negative and marginally significant (t=-1.91, p=0.06) and LONG*SPEC*FEE is positive and marginally significant (t=1.78, p=0.08). Again, we do not find a significant tenure by fee interaction. 17 The coefficients for SHORT*SPEC (t=-0.66, p=0.51) and SHORT*SPEC*FEE (t=-0.07, p=0.95) are not statistically significant.
As before, we do not find a significant tenure by fee interaction. The coefficients for DTENU*FEE (t=-0.89, p=0.38), SHORT*FEE (t=-0.40, p=0.69) and LONG*FEE (t=-1.8, p=0.17) are all insignificant.
Effect of SOX on audit quality
To assess whether our results are influenced by the passing of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, we repeat our analyses for both pre-and post-SOX periods (i.e., the
2000-2001 period versus the 2002-2005 period).
Similar to our main analysis, the three-way interactions (DTENU*SPEC*FEE) are significant for both pre-and post-period (t=1.86, p=0.06 and t=2.38, p=0.02 respectively). However, the coefficient for LONG*SPEC*FEE is positive and marginally significant only in the pre-period (t=1.77, p=0.09), but not in the post-period (t=1.25, p=0.21). The coefficients for SHORT*SPEC*FEE are both insignificant in the pre-and post-SOX periods (t=0.80, p=0.43 and t=-0.90, p=0.37, respectively). The coefficients for all two-way interactions are consistent with our main analysis. Overall, the results are similar to those reported in the main analysis, though the effect of tenure, fee and audit specialization is comparatively weaker in the post-SOX period.
Audit quality of former Arthur Andersen clients
Prior research suggests that successor auditors view an Andersen audit as a unique source of litigation risk and use earnings conservatism as a risk management strategy (Cahan and Zhang 2006) . To address this possibility, we remove from our sample 2,340 
Alternative proxies of audit quality
We conduct our empirical tests on additional proxies of audit quality: propensity for auditors to issue going-concern opinion to financially distressed firms and the market's response to quarterly earnings surprises (i.e., earnings-returns coefficients). We define financially distressed firms to be firms with positive Zmijewski scores. 18 There are a total of 560 firm-years that meet the criterion and of these, 134 firms (24% of sample) receive going-concern opinions for the first time during the sample period. We have 9,321 firm-years for the earnings response coefficient (ERC) test.
Untabulated results indicate that for the going concern test, the coefficient estimate These results for both the going-concern and ERC tests are consistent with our main analyses using the accrual quality measure.
Conclusion
In this study, we investigate whether the relation between auditor tenure and audit quality is conditional on auditor specialization and fee dependence (in terms of economic contribution to the public accounting firm's income). Our main analyses, using accrual quality as a measure of audit quality, show that firms audited by specialists (vs. nonspecialists) have relatively higher audit quality with extended auditor tenure, and that this relation is negatively moderated by auditors' fee dependence on clients. These results are generally robust to alternative specifications and sensitivity analyses, and across other proxies for audit quality (going concern opinions, earnings response coefficients).
Our study contributes to the literature on the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality. Existing studies examine a main effect of auditor tenure and/or the separate moderating effect of either auditor specialization or fee dependence, and findings have been mixed. From a theoretical perspective, we extend extant literature by showing that the auditor tenure-audit quality relation is moderated by both auditor specialization and fee dependence. Focusing on either one moderator alone (either specialization or fee dependence) necessarily provides a less complete depiction of the conditions under which auditor tenure improves or impairs audit quality.
Our findings also provide useful inputs to regulators and standard setters in their deliberations on the efficacy and costs of mandatory auditor rotation. Our results imply that there are benefits to mandatory rotation, but that these benefits are limited in that they will not extend to all auditors and their clients. Rather, benefits in terms of improved audit quality derived from mandatory auditor rotation are contingent on auditors' industry specialization and fee dependence. Our findings should also be of interest to public accounting firms that have been lobbying against audit firm rotation (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2007). Perhaps, more importantly, we provide evidence useful to public accounting firms in identifying ways they can improve audit quality while maintaining long-term ties with existing clients. One way is to invest resources to develop specialist expertise in the industry that the client operates in, while another is to have a more diversified client base, without overly high dependence on any client. These approaches are ultimately policy issues that public accounting firms have to decide on. The table shows mean coefficients from annual cross-sectional regressions of the following model:
The above model is based on Dechow and Dichev (2002) , as modified by McNichols (2002) . CA is current accruals measured by net income before extraordinary items plus deprecation and amortization minis operating cash flow; OCF is operating cash flow at year t-1, t ,and t+1; ΔREV is change in revenues; PPE is gross value of property, plant, and equipment. All variables are scaled by average total assets. The regression is run for each industry-year with a minimum of 20 observations in each 2-digit SIC industry. Adj. R 2 is the average of the adjusted R 2 from the 286 industry-year regressions. The tstatistics are based on the mean of the coefficients from the industry-year regressions. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (2-tailed), respectively. Table 2 . DTENU is an indicator variable that equals one if the auditor tenure is greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise. SHORT is indicator variable that equals one when the length of the auditor-client relationship is three years or less, and zero otherwise. LONG is an indicator variable that equals one when the length of the auditor-client relationship is nine years or longer, and zero otherwise. MV is natural log of market value. INGR is industry sales growth over the year (by two-digit SIC code). OCF is cash flow from operations scaled by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. LITIG is coded one if the firm operates in a high-litigation industry, and zero otherwise. High-litigation industries are industries with SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7374 . ZSCORE is Zmijewski's (1984) bankruptcy scores. MB is the market-to-book ratio. AGE is log of firm age. SPEC, an indicator variable, equals one if the auditor has at least 24% industry market share for the 2000-2001 period, and 30% for the 2002-2005 period, and zero otherwise. FEE is measured by the ratio of a particular client's total fees given all total fees received by the audit firm in a city. Table 3 . We run the OLS clustered by firm, and with year dummies. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year dummies. For each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the t statistic in parentheses. '*', '**', and '***' denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. BSPEC, an indicator variable, equals one if the auditor is is a specialist both at the national and city level. See footnotes of tables 3 and 4 for model specification and variable definitions. '*', '**', and '***' denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. McNichols (2002) . For the negative accruals sample, we multiply the residuals by -1 to conserve the signs of the coefficients. See footnote of tables 3 and 4 for model specification and variable definitions. '*', '**', and '***' denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
